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Much work in philosophy is concerned with
logicalreasoning, andmuchelsewithmysterious
metaphysical things whichmightmakeyouagree
with Sir Isaiah Berlin, who once said
"Philosophers are adults who persist in asking
childish questions'".1 Unsurprisingly, there are
those who think that asking a moral philosopher
to deal with practical ethical questions is rather
like asking a psychoanalyst to perform brain
surgery: he is completely inappropriate for the
task.
Commonly, there are two presuppositions ofthe
view that moral theorising has nothing to say
about practical matters: one is that moral
theorising is meretheory andis supposedto leave
everything as it is, and is therefore of purely
formal interest, so that there are no practical
implications whatsoever; and the other is that
moraltheorisingdoeshavepracticalimplications,
but moral theorists squabble so much that they
would produce far too many answers to practical
questions, all of them different.
I would notbehere ifItookeitherofthose views.
While it is true that there are many inconsistent
approaches to what moral philosophy is, and
understandingitallisoftenratherasLewisCarroll
put it in Alice through the Looking-Glass: trying
to believe "six impossible things before
breakfast",2 there is one central concern which
boththepracticalandtheoretical sidesofmorality
share: that of justification. The essence of an
ethical dilemma is that we do not know which
side to choose, for neither side is self-evidently
the only right choice. In the case of a difficult
decision,therightchoicewillbeajustifiedchoice,
and the better choice the more justified choice.
The study of justification is a traditional
philosophical study. We need to understand the
kinds of reasons which will justify our choices.
If you want to know what "justification" is you
should ask what a "good" justification is. There
are two ways ofjustifying things well. However,
describing these two ways is not straightforward,
because many people find the concept of
"justification" difficult, and then find the idea of
splitting it up into two further kinds even more
difficult. I shall therefore begin with an easier
idea, the idea ofexplanation. There are two ways
of explaining things well, just as there are two
ways of justifying things well. One way of
understandingagoodexplanation istounderstand
it as removing puzzlement on the part of those
hearing it. If the explanation removes such
puzzlement, then itis a success. Ifitdoes not, and
such misunderstanding continues, then the
explanation is a failure. We often expect
schoolteachers to be good at explaining things in
this way.
By contrast, the physical sciences try to explain
the way the world works, and we ordinarily think
that what makes a scientific explanation a good
one is that it gives the true causes of things, or
something of the kind. On the other hand, if the
explanation says something scientifically false,
then it is a bad explanation. But the kind of
explanation which gives the true causes ofthings
is in principle very different from the kind of
explanation which successfully removes
puzzlement. The kind of explanation which
successfully removes puzzlement may very well
not give the true causes ofthings, while our best
explanations ofthe way the world works may be
impossibleformostpeopletounderstand. (Indeed,
it may be that the correct explanation ofthe way
the world works is impossible for anybody to
understand.) It would be intellectually very
satisfying ifhuman understanding and objective
truth went naturally together, but they are
nevertheless different in principle. There are two
kinds ofexplanation. One kind ofexplanation is
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measured against the existing understanding of
people. Theotherkindofexplanation is measured
against the way the world is. One kind of
explanation is measured by a subjective test. The
other is measured by an objective test.
The distinction I have drawn between two kinds
of explanation works also for the two kinds of
justification. Justification ofourmoral choices in
ethicaldilemmas couldbemeasuredagainsteither
subjective orobjective tests. Moral philosophers
have spent the best part of three thousand years
trying to find objective tests for justification. It
would be marvellous if a kind ofmoral "reality"
could be found, a certainty against which we
could test our moral beliefs. Philosophers have
not succeeded. In consequence, what counts as a
good reason for a moral choice has a very great
deal to do with what satisfies other people as a
good reason. It is this which makes the
understandingoflawcentraltotheunderstanding
ofpractical ethical decisions, for in our tradition
law commonly represents the outcome of much
accepted moral reasoning.
The theory oflaw involves as many squabbles as
other branches of philosophy. There are those
who think that law is merely what Parliament
commands, andthatitisessentially anexercise in
force. Fromthispointofview, itishistorical luck
ifourlawsoverlapsignificantlywiththedemands
ofmorality. However, youhavetoobeyitwhether
it does or not. On this approach, you in medical
practice have to comply with the law because the
authorities will get you ifyou don't. And there is
no doubt that law at some times and in some
countries can make demands backed by force
which are very far from what morality would
require or permit. Yet we are fortunate in our
traditions that law is notmerely thatwhich is laid
down in some arbitrary way. There are multiple
sources ofthelaw, andtherealityofitsapplication
lies in the courtroom, where a determination is
madeoftherights andwrongs ofparticularcases.
The highest courts do not mechanically pass on
Parliamentary legislation, butdraw ontraditional
conceptions of right and wrong, principles of
justice, other decisions in similar cases and the
like, allwoventogetherinareasonedjustification
of what is required in the particular case. In our
tradition, legal decisions are essentiallyjustified
decisions. That our legal tradition at its heart
involvesreasonedjustification isoneofthecentral
grounds for seeing it as essentially a moral
enterprise. While there are no doubt many areas
where the law's demands do not always accord
with everyone's conceptions of what would be
the morally right outcome, a procedure which
essentially embodies a reasonedjustification for
theoutcome is in itselfamoralprocedure, andthe
outcome is morallyjustifiable precisely because
it is the outcome of a moral procedure.
This is one lesson we can draw from the shared
world of both judicial decisions and moral
decisions: that determining the answer to an
ethical dilemma is a matter of reasoned
justification. We are fortunate that, in the case of
many dilemmas in medical ethics, some fine
judicial minds have been applied to the required
reasoning. That reasoning includes recognising
relevantParliamentary legislation asauthoritative,
and I shall not consider (this evening) arguments
for changes in legislation. I take the moral
dilemmas we face in practice to be those which
arise within the framework of current law, in
situations where clearly established law does not
tell us what to do. Both medical practitioners and
judges can find themselves having to determine
what ought to be done in the light of such
uncertainty.
Who ought to decide these matters? A doctor
should not try to second-guess what a judge
might determine about an ethical dilemma,
particularly ifthe courts have made clearthatit is
their place to make a decision in certain types of
case. What the doctor should do - where the
decision is his to make - is adopt the right
procedure. This is in effect to ape ideal judicial
reasoning by being able to provide justification
when called upon, justification which displays a
reasonedconsiderationoftherelevantprinciples.
Adopting a reasoned course ofjustification still
leavesroomfordifferentpeopletomakedifferent
decisions aboutthe same case, but whatevertheir
decision is it may still bejustified. It should not
be thought thatjustifiably choosing one horn ofa
dilemma always means that the other choice
would have been unjustified. There is often, in
bothmoralityandlaw, morethanonerightanswer,
bothjustified, and neither morejustified than the
other. Whatoften matters ismerelythemakingof
a decision, rather than what that decision is,
although this does not mean that any decision
will do.
In the complex moral areas concerning
resuscitation of dying and incompetent patients
much ofthe relevant reasoning appears in what is
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familiarly known as the Bland case.3 Anthony
Bland was a victim of the Hillsborough football
stadium disaster, which left him in a persistent
vegetative state, a state in which the cortex ofthe
brain loses all function and activity. With an
empty mind and no possible hope of recovery,
Blandwaskeptalivebybeingartificially fed, and
given close nursing and medical care as
appropriate to cure orprevent various infections.
The family, the consultant concerned and
independent doctors all backed the relevant
Hospital Trust in asking for a declaration by the
courts that they might lawfully discontinue all
life-sustainingandmedicaltreatmentandartificial
nutrition and hydration.
Why go to the courts with this at all? Notice that
the doctors did not go to the courts in the first
place asking that they might lawfully begin and
continue withappropriatetreatmentandartificial
feeding. Yet at first sight they might well have
done so. This is because both the treatment and
the artificial feeding were - as they would
standardly be in suchacase -ofan invasive kind,
anditisafamiliarfeatureofbothlawandmorality
that one is not entitled to interfere with the body
of another without their consent. Otherwise it is
an assault. Doctors know that consent standardly
has tobesought. Yetinthecaseofanincompetent
patient such as Bland it was plain that consent
would not be forthcoming. In such cases various
principles of substituted choice may be morally
defensible, butinBritish lawdoctors areunderan
obligation to act only in accordance with the
patient's best interests.4
Thenotion of"best interests" is fertile ground for
moral dilemmas. To begin with, the obligation to
act only in accordance with the patient's best
interests is ambiguous. It might mean that a
doctormustactwhetherhelikes itornot, butonly
in so far as it is in the patient's best interests; or
it might mean that a doctor may or may not act as
he chooses, but if he does then it must be in the
patient's best interests. The principle of the
sanctity of life drives the matter here, but in the
BlandcaseLordKeithremarkedthattheprinciple
of the sanctity of life is not an absolute one. He
said, "It does not compel a medical practitioner
on pain of criminal sanctions to treat a patient,
who will die if he does not, contrary to the
express wishes of the patient".5 In addition to
refusal of consent, there are other grounds for
defeating theprinciple ofthe sanctity oflife, such
as killing in self-defence. So the principle of the
sanctity oflife can be defeated, but it stands if it
is not defeated, and it is plain that, if it is not
defeated (by a patient refusing consent, for
example), it directs doctors to act in the patient's
best interests where they are able to do so. One
would not therefore need the court's explicit
permission to act in a patient's best interests,
since thatpermission is in effect already given in
terms ofthe legal principle ofthe sanctity oflife.
Yet note that this is only permission to do that
which is in the patient's best interests. If it was
not in Bland's best interests to be artificially fed
and treated then the doctors doing so were not
justified. So it is not the case that a doctor needs
legalpermission to stoptreatingthePVS casebut
does not need it to start; on the contrary, legal
permission is required both to start and to stop.
The legal permission to start already exists in the
principle of the sanctity of life. That legal
permission lapses whenthetreatmentisnolonger
in the patient's best interests. One goes to court,
in suchcircumstances, foranexplicit direction as
to what is and what is not in the patient's best
interests.
But why go to court about this? It is sometimes
wronglythoughtthatitisformedicalpractitioners
to determine, in such cases, what is in apatient's
bestinterests. ThusLordJusticeNeillinadifferent
case referred to "that which the general body of
medical opinion in the particular specialty would
consider to be in the best interests of the patient
in order to maintain the health and secure the
well-being ofthe patient".6 Here the words "best
interests" are not well-chosen. In ordinary
parlance "best interests" marks a superlative, an
ultimategood; itwouldnormallybetaken torefer
totheend, goal orfinalpurpose ofsomecourseof
action. At the extreme it is life itselfwhich is the
highestaiminmedicalcare. Allthisismisleading.
It is plain from Lord Justice Neill's remarks,
examined carefully, that "best interests" refers,
not to the end, but to the means towards the end.
For Neill, the "means" is the medical
determination of "best interests" towards an
"end"; the "end" is "health and well-being". It
follows that, while "best interests" is to be
determined by the general body of medical
opinion, this is only in so far as "best interests" is
a means, not an end. Lord Mustill in Bland put it
differently: "best interests" refers both to the
medical determination of the means and also to
the ethical determination of the end. It is an
ethical and legal matter that, for example, a long
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healthy life is in the patient's best interests, but a
medical matter how that goal is to be achieved.
With regard to the ethical matter, Lord Mustill
said, "there is no reason in logic why on such a
decision the opinions of doctors should be
decisive". Doctors are concerned with means,
not ends. In the Blandcase, the problem was not
the medical one ofthe best means to be adopted,
forsofaraswasknownallthatcouldbemedically
doneforBlandwasapparentlybeingdone,without
anydisagreementofsubstance. Thedoctors were
under a duty to act in Bland's best interests, but
faced an ethical and legal problem whether the
outcome for Bland of the best medical attention
was infactinBland'sbest interests. Theproblem
was the end, not the means.
The determination of what is in Bland's best
interests is in principle a completely different
matter from any criminal considerations which
might arise. One can imagine a legal system in
which doctors were never liable for any criminal
sanction for actions undertaken in the course of
their work. In such a system the problem ofwhat
was in Bland's best interests would still arise.
"Bestinterests" in some cases mightnotbe alife-
threatening issue at all. But when the hospital in
Bland asked for a determination that it would be
"lawful" to withdraw life-sustaining treatment
theywerenotaskingdirectly whatwas in Bland's
best interests but asking what they could do
withoutcommitting acrime, andthecourtsargued
much of the material on the basis of this quite
distinct question.
Itisplainenough,legallyandmorally,thatdoctors
arenotalloweddeliberatelytokillpeople.Legally
the crime of murder standardly involves two
elements: what is called the "actus reus", or evil
actwhichbrings aboutdeath, and the "mens rea",
which is the evil intention so to do. Ifthe doctors
in Bland deliberately acted so as to bring about
Bland'sdeaththentheywouldbeguiltyofmurder,
and this has nothing whatever to do with the
question whether Bland's best interests wouldbe
served by dying. But what if the doctors
deliberately withdraw artificial life support
measures? Is this an act which causes death, or is
it an omission which allows death to be caused
naturally?
In his judgement in Bland, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson referred to Professor Glanville
Williams's Textbook ofCriminal Law as support
for his view that withdrawing life support is an
omission. Williams explains the difference
between an act and an omission: "A crime [he
said] can be committed by omission, but there
canbe no omission in law inthe absence ofaduty
to act. The reason is obvious. If there is an act,
someoneacts;butifthereisanomission, everyone
(in a sense) omits".8 Ifthis is right, the difference
between an act and an omission is much easier to
make than many philosophers have thought. If
there is anact, thenitwillbethe actofaparticular
person who in ordinary circumstances can be
readily identified. But if there is an omission, it
will not be the omission of a particular person
unless it is possible to identify the person who
had the duty to act. So ifeverybody in the world
(apart from the doctors) had omitted to treat
Bland intending that he should die naturally, and
he did, then nobody has committed murder, for
while the mens rea existed on the part ofall these
people there would have been no actus reus. But
whathappens ifthedoctorsdeliberately withdraw
life supportknowingthatthis willbe followedby
Bland's death? Only ifthey have aduty to actand
do not do so, only then do we have a situation
where we can identify the source ofthe omission.
A crime can be committed by omission; is this
one of those cases?
In the Bland case, if the withdrawal of artificial
life support is an act, then this act, together with
the undoubted knowledge that this would bring
about Bland's death, is one of murder. There is
both actus reus and mens rea. If, on the other
hand,thecourseofeventsconstitutedanomission,
thenthiscoursewould stillamountto murder, but
onlyifthoseinvolvedwereunderaduty toensure
as best they could that Bland did not die. Ifthose
involved were not under a duty to ensure as best
they could that Bland did not die then we cannot
identify anyone or any action as being at fault.
There is then no actus reus and no nmurder is
involved.
LordsBrowne-Wilkinson andGoff9made itclear
that removing the nasogastric tube necessary for
feeding was not an act but an omission. This,
however, does not solve the problem since the
doctors concerned may have been underaduty to
ensure as best they could that Bland did not die,
and if that were so then the acts/omissions
distinction will not help them. This point was
made clear by Lord Mustill.'0 The question is
then, were the doctors under a duty to ensure as
best they could that Bland did not die? They were
certainly under a duty of "care", but this, as we
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have seen, requires only that doctors act in the
"best interests" of the incompetent patient. The
question comes down logically to this: Is it in the
bestinterests ofBlandthathebepreventedbythe
doctors from dying? This question is quite
different from asking whether it is in the best
interests of Bland that he die. This is not a case
where thedoctorsneed to arguethatBlandwould
be better offdead; it is merely a case where they
need to argue only that Bland would be no worse
off dead.
To provide a succinct summary ofthe argument,
theposition is thatBland's PVS condition is such
that he has nothing left to lose. He would be no
worse offdead, even ifhe would be no better off
dead. It is not in his best interests that he be kept
alive because he does not benefit from it. The
doctors' duty ofcare is restricted to Bland's best
interests. Therefore they are not justified in
continuing with the invasive life support system.
Therefore since it is unjustified they have a duty
to withdraw it.
All these arguments depend on Bland having
nothing left to lose. I described Bland as having
an empty mind, but how true is that? Bland's
brain was, as onejudge summarised it, a"mass of
watery fluid"." It may be thought that a clear
relationship between mind and brain is assumed
inthe legaldecision: thatwith nobrainthere is no
mind. Is this assumption right?
We must accept that we know very little about
consciousness and the nature ofmind. Whatever
beliefs we may have about the issue, there is no
demonstrably certain knowledge whether
consciousness or mind can exist independently
of physical existents like the brain. I think our
best understanding is probably that conscious
experience as weknowit, whichisconsciousness
of the physical world around us, depends on
having the physical brain and sense organs that
are familiar to us. But while this may be wrong,
it need not be a moral concern. For if conscious
life can existindependently ofthephysical body,
then it need not worry us if we are unable or
unwilling to preserve or prolong the life of the
physicalbody.If,ontheotherhand,consciousness
cannot exist independently ofthe physical body,
then if the physical matters on which
consciousness depends, like the brain, have
already dissolved, we are already too late. Given
his physical state, nothing we could do for Bland
could possibly affect his conscious state. The
upshot is that the Bland case is easier than it
might be.
I don't think I have asked any childish questions
yetandthushavenotliveduptoBerlin's standards
for a philosopher. To make up for this, I will
conclude with a brief speculation about some of
these mysterious things. I have said that we do
not understand consciousness. We do not have
the right explanatory language which will make
mind fit in with the other things which we think
wedounderstand, suchasthosewhichthenatural
sciences cover. Like the scientists who thought
that atoms were like billiard balls and that heat
was afluid, likethecognitive theorists who think
that the mind is a computer, we think about the
mind in terms of metaphors. We have given up
some metaphors in our understanding of mind,
such as Descartes' mental substance, but we still
use the metaphor of a "point of view". Much of
our imagining in the case of PVS patients and
others similarly placed consists in trying
ineffectually to see things from their point of
view.
Computers existforengineering design: one may
design acar, forexample, and plan the top, front,
rear and side views. Enter such plans in the
computer, with specified dimensions and
parameters, andthecomputercanthenpresenton
its monitor a three-dimensional image ofthe car.
This image may then be rotated so as to present
the car's appearance from different points of
view. The computer may fail in some way, and
leave one looking at the offside rear of the car
instead of from some other desired perspective.
Itis plainly amerecontingency thatIcannot, like
such a computer, move my point ofview around
the three-dimensional world which I inhabit.
Granted that, my eyes being where they are, a
certain position is (so far as I know) "causally"
natural and no doubt useful, still the world which
I see is underdetermined by my immediate
experiences and necessarily involves some
imaginativeinput on mypart. Likethedesigner's
computer which shows the car from different
standpoints, only sometechnicality stopsmefrom
being able to move my point of view, given the
information which my brain currently has, from
itspresentlocationbehindmyeyestotheopposite
side ofthe room, or even as ifit were positioned
in your body which just happens to be in my
perceptual range. It is true thatI lackexperiential
information about what is, from my present point
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ofview, thefarsideofobjects, butI would supply
the deficiency inan automatic way onthebasis of
memory (as I do now in many situations), and the
results would at worst be no more odd than some
of the results of split-brain operations. Illness,
like thecomputerfailure, might leave one with an
unexpected point of view, and this may explain
that reported phenomenon of people "leaving
their bodies" when close to death. IfI moved my
point of view, then I could operate my body
apparently from a distance. Maybe evolution
could give us these skills. I leave you to imagine
just how different our understanding of the
relationship between mind and brain would
become if these serious possibilities came into
being. Perhaps they will.'2
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